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Abstract 
This paper investigates free licensing strategy with a flexible privatization policy in a mixed 
oligopoly in which licensing contracts are observable before the government chooses its optimal degree 
of ex post privatisation. We examine and compare foreign and public licensors and explore the strategic 
relationship between the foreign share of passive ownership in domestic firms and the cost efficiency 
gap between licensor and licensee. We show that licensing strategies always yield more privatization 
and higher welfare, but the incentive for free licensing between the foreign licensor and public licensor 
differ. We also consider open technology, where all firms have the same technology and find a 
contrasting result. The optimal degree of privatization under open technology is the lowest (highest) 
under foreign (public) licensing contracts. 
Keywords: free licensing; foreign licensing; public licensing; technology gap; passive ownership; 
flexible privatization; optimal privatization; open technology 
1. Introduction 
As globalization advances, many firms utilize their rival’s advanced technologies by paying license fees 
(or even under free licensing) instead of directly reducing production costs through R&D. We can 
observe different types of technology sharing in various industries in the real world. For example, the 
CSIRO licensed new medical polymer technologies to PolyNovo in 2005 (Niu, 2017).1 BMW licensed 
its engine technology to a Chinese state‐owned enterprise, Dongfeng, to produce Motor Corporation, 
Fengxing T5 SUV in 2018. Additionally, US-based Tesla implemented an open technology by opening 
its patent rights related to electric vehicles without any fees in 2014. Accordingly, Toyota also opened 
its Fuel Cell Vehicle (FCV) patents technology in 2015.2 We can find these different forms of free 
licensing strategies among both private and public licensors. 
                                           
1 The CSIRO (Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation) is an Australian government 
agency responsible for scientific research and PolyNovo is a biotechnology partner and company created by the 
CSIRO. 
2 Toyota Motor Corporation will allow royalty-free use of approximately 5,680 of its FCV-related patent licenses. 
Toyota believes it is important to prioritise the widespread use of FCVs at the initial introduction stage. 
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Many global firms also diversify their risk by holding some stakes in domestic competitors to gain 
an edge over the competition. In this process, we sometimes see that shareholders do not exercise their 
ownership, which is known as passive ownership.3 This situation often arises in a competitive market 
partially because it can reduce the risk of doing business. For example, if shareholders actively use 
ownership power with shareholder votes, then they may harm domestic welfare by their strengthened 
market power. Thus, the government can impose legal sanctions to weaken such monopoly power. 
Despite the global trend of liberalization, many public enterprises with significant government 
ownership are still active in strategic sectors and control large portions of the world’s resources. They 
are significant players in mixed oligopolistic sectors such as transportation, telecommunications, energy, 
and finance in OECD countries, where public enterprises compete with private enterprises.4 Since the 
1980s, however, privatization in these industries attracted extensive policy attention from economics 
researchers in developed, developing, and transitional economies such as Eastern Europe, Latin 
America, and Asia, including China.  
The relationship that technology transfer by foreign firms affects in privatization is a crucial issue in 
a mixed oligopoly under passive ownership.5 However, little attention has been paid to the relationship 
between technology transfer with passive ownership and privatization. There are a few theoretical 
papers that combine the issues of technology transfer with licensing contracts in a mixed oligopoly. 
Mukherjee and Sinha (2014) show that technology licensing cannot bridge the efficiency difference and 
confirms the possibility of partial privatization. Wang and Zeng (2019) and Wang et al. (2020) examine 
how licensing contracts from an efficient private firm (or public firm) to either a public firm or a private 
(domestic or foreign) firm affects privatization. They demonstrate that licensing to the private firm 
provides further motivation for privatization, while licensing to the public firm reduces the incentives 
for privatization compared to foreign licensing. Haraguchi and Matsumura (2020a) also examine 
                                           
3 Passive ownership refers to any shareholder in a business who is not involved in the firm’s operational decision-
making, which might require shareholder votes. We currently see interest from researchers and policymakers 
regarding the impact of passive ownership in rival firms. For recent works on the competitive and anticompetitive 
effects of passive ownership, see Li et al. (2015), Schmalz (2018) and Papadopoulos et al. (2019). 
4 According to an OECD report by Kowalski et al. (2013), more than 10% of the 2000 largest companies are 
public enterprises with sales equivalent to approximately 6% of worldwide GDP. In particular, public enterprises 
still have a significant presence and compete with private enterprises in planned and transitional countries such as 
China, Vietnam, and Russia. For some evidence from Asian countries such as Japan, China, Vietnam and so on, 
see Huang and Yang (2016), Chen (2017), Fridman (2018), Lee et al. (2018), Kim et al. (2019) and Xu et al. 
(2017, 2020). 
5 The recent decade witnessed increasing application of mixed oligopoly frameworks in which domestic public 
and foreign private firms compete in the market. Previous studies investigated the effect of the introduction of 
foreign private firms on market prices and welfare. For example, Pal and White (2003), Yu and Lee (2011), Lee 
et al. (2013), Xu and Lee (2015) and Cato and Matsumura (2015) discussed the relationship between privatization 
and trade policies, while Lin and Matsumura (2012), Cato and Matsumura (2012) and Xu et al. (2017) considered 
foreign penetration of the private firm’s ownership. Regarding licensing issues, see Ye (2012), Chen et al. (2014), 
Niu (2015) and Kim et al. (2018) 
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technology licensing between foreign-owned private firms and show that technology transfer will likely 
occur in only one direction, in which domestic enterprises do not transfer technology to foreign 
enterprises even if domestic enterprises have superior knowledge. They further find that privatization 
motivates voluntary technology transfer from foreign to domestic firms. 
In this paper, we investigate a free licensing strategy in which a licensor transfers technology 
voluntarily to a domestic firm, though it will face potential privatizaion in the future.6 In a sequential 
game where the licensor can determine the free licensing contract first and then the government chooses 
its optimal degree of ex post privatization, we examine and compare foreign licensing and public 
licensing, respectively, in a mixed oligopoly where a public firm competes with two private firms, one 
domestic and one foreign. We explore the strategic relationship between the foreign share of passive 
ownership in domestic firms and the cost efficiency gap between licensor and licensee. We show that 
licensing strategies always yield more privatization and higher welfare. Our results reveal that the 
existence of a public firm and potential future privatization encourages voluntary technology transfers 
from the licensor to the domestic private firm. The easing of privatization induced by free licensing will 
also mitigate competition in the market but increase social welfare. 
The main findings of this paper are as follows. When the licensor transfers its advanced technology 
to the domestic firm, the licensee’s production cost reduction accelerates competition in the production 
market, which induces the government to increase the degree of privatization. Consequently, free 
licensing can increase the domestic private firm’s profit and welfare, but the incentive for free licensing 
between the foreign licensor and the public licensor differs. On the one hand, the foreign licensor will 
perceive that the government is implementing more privatization, while passive ownership of the 
domestic firm is essential to determine free licensing. Therefore, with a significant amount of foreign 
ownership, the easing of privatization induced by free licensing will increase social welfare. On the 
other hand, the public licensor can choose free licensing only when the cost gap is relatively low 
irrespective of the foreign ownership share.  
We also show that the optimal degree of privatization under foreign licensing is always higher than 
that under public licensing. This finding implies that the foreign licensor creates more motivation for 
privatization, but state-owned enterprises may act as implicit industrial policies to extract advanced 
technologies from foreign firms to improve the productivity of domestic firms or to prevent the outflow 
of domestic capital to foreign countries by improving the productivity of domestic firms.  
Finally, we consider open technology where all firms have the same technology and show a 
contrasting result: the optimal degree of privatization under open technology is the lowest (highest) 
                                           
6 Regarding the welfare effects of ex post privatization when the government lacks commitment, see Xu et al. 
(2017), Lee et al. (2018), Chen et al. (2019) and Haraguchi and Matsumura (2020b). 
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under foreign (public) licensing contracts. However, both foreign and public licensors do not adopt open 
technology even if it can be socially desirable. It is therefore necessary for the government to induce 
the licensor to implement open technology under certain regulations. 
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model. We examine voluntary 
technology transfer by a foreign licensor and a public licensor in Sections 3 and 4, respectively. In 
Section 5, we compare the two licensing strategies and discuss the welfare effect of open technology. 
Section 6 concludes. 
2. The basic model 
We consider a mixed triopoly market in which one public firm (firm 0) and two private firms (firm 1 
and 2) compete in a Cournot fashion. Each firm produces homogeneous products, 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 (𝑖𝑖 = 0, 1, 2), with 
an inverse linear demand function. 𝑝𝑝(𝑄𝑄) = 𝑎𝑎 − 𝑄𝑄, (1)  
where 𝑝𝑝 is the market price and 𝑄𝑄 = ∑ 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖2𝑖𝑖=0  is total output. The cost function of each firm is denoted 
by 𝐶𝐶(𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖) = 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖2, where 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 represents the cost efficiency parameter of the firm, 𝑖𝑖 = 0, 1, 2.  
The profit function of each firm is defined as 
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 = 𝑝𝑝(𝑄𝑄)𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 − 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖(𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖). (2) 
We assume that firm 0 is a semi-public firm that can be (partially) privatized by the government and 
both firms 1 and 2 are private firms, where firm 1 is a domestic firm and firm 2 is a foreign firm, 
respectively. We further assume that firm 2 owns a portion of the shares of firm 1, 𝛽𝛽 ∈ [0, 1), with the 
silent financial form of passive ownership; that is, the foreign firm has passive partial ownership in the 
domestic firm, which implies that foreign shareholders do not affect the production decisions of firm 1. 
Social welfare is the sum of the consumer surplus and domestic firms’ profits.  
𝑊𝑊 = 12𝑄𝑄2 + 𝜋𝜋0 + (1 − 𝛽𝛽)𝜋𝜋1. (3) 
Each firm has different objective functions. Following Matsumura (1998), firm 0 is a public firm that 
maximizes 𝑉𝑉0, which is a convex combination of social welfare and its own profit.  𝑉𝑉0 = (1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝑊𝑊 + 𝜃𝜃𝜋𝜋0, (4) 




Because domestic firm 1 operates under passive ownership, it can maximize its own profit without 
direct interruption from firm 2. That is, the objective of firm 1 is  𝑉𝑉1 = (1 − 𝛽𝛽)𝜋𝜋1, (5) 
where 𝛽𝛽 ∈ [0, 1) is the ratio of foreign ownership. Note that maximization of 𝑉𝑉1 is equivalent to 
maximizing 𝜋𝜋1. The foreign firm 2 maximizes its total profits. 𝑉𝑉2 = 𝜋𝜋2 + 𝛽𝛽𝜋𝜋1. (6) 
Finally, we consider a free licensing contract between the licensor (efficient firm) and licensee 
(inefficient firm) under different cost efficiency parameters among the firms, where 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 ∈ [0, 1]. For 
simplicity, we assume that an efficient firm has 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 = k ∈ [0, 1), while an inefficient firm has 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 = 1, 
which denotes the standard level of technology. That is, 𝑘𝑘 represents the relative technical gap between 
the licensor and licensee. We assume that the cost condition under a free licensing contract becomes 𝑘𝑘𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 𝑘𝑘𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 𝑘𝑘 < 𝑘𝑘𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆 = 1 . This condition implies that if a licensor transfers its 
advanced technology to its rival firm, then a licensee produces outputs with the same efficiency.7  
Below, we consider two different forms of free licensing contracts: foreign licensing and public 
licensing. 8  In the former, we examine whether the foreign firm intends to transfer its advanced 
technology to rival firm 1, of which shares are partially owned by the licensor. In the latter, we examine 
whether the public firm intends to transfer technology to domestic firm 1 but not foreign firm 2, of 
which profit is also taken into the objectives of the licensor. 
The game runs as follows. In the first stage, the licensor independently chooses whether to transfer 
to the rival firm. In the second stage, the government chooses the optimal degree of privatization.9 In 
the third stage, each firm simultaneously chooses its output to maximize its objectives in a Cournot 
fashion. We solve the game by backward induction. 
  
                                           
7 We assume that technology transfer is verifiable and contractible when the licensor can transfer it to the licensee 
for free. 
8 We first consider a case with only one licensor that will provide a free licensing contract to the only rival firm. 
Later, we further consider an open technology where the licensor opens the advanced technology so that both rival 
firms can produce outputs efficiently. 
9 The timing of the game where the government moves after observing the licensor’s decision of free licensing 
indicates the possibilities of flexible privatization. For more discussion, see Haraguchi and Matsumura (2020b). 
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3. Foreign licensing 
In this section, we examine the foreign licensor’s decision and compare the equilibrium outcomes 
between the no licensing and free licensing strategies. In this case, foreign firm 2 has 𝑘𝑘2 = 𝑘𝑘, while 
both firm 0 and firm 1 have 𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗 = 1 (j ≠ 2) under no licensing, while firm 2 can provide free licensing 
to domestic firm 1, which results in 𝑘𝑘1 = 𝑘𝑘2 = 𝑘𝑘 < 𝑘𝑘0 = 𝑘𝑘. 
In the last stage, each firm simultaneously chooses its output to maximize its objective equation (4), 
(5), and (6). We provide the equilibrium outcomes of the last stage in Appendix A. Below, we will 
examine and compare the no licensing and free licensing cases. 
3.1 No licensing  
When the advanced technology is not transferred to its rival firm, the foreign firm is the only efficient 
firm; that is, the domestic firm is inefficient. The cost conditions become 𝑘𝑘0 = 𝑘𝑘1 = 1 > 𝑘𝑘2 = 𝑘𝑘. We 
can set them in the equilibrium outcomes in Appendix A. Then, in the second stage, the government 
decides the degree of privatization under no licensing to maximize the social welfare in (A5): 
𝜃𝜃𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = 26−8𝛽𝛽+4𝑘𝑘(5+2𝑘𝑘+(2−𝛽𝛽)𝛽𝛽)71−8𝛽𝛽+4𝑘𝑘(32+(8−𝛽𝛽)𝛽𝛽+𝑘𝑘(11+12𝛽𝛽)), (7) 
where the superscript 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁  indicates “no licensing with the foreign licensor”. Then, we have the 
following Lemma:10 
Lemma 1. With a foreign licensor, the optimal degree of privatization under no licensing is partial; that 
is, 𝜃𝜃𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ∈ (0, 1), which is decreasing in 𝛽𝛽 and 𝑘𝑘; that is, 𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝜕𝜕𝛽𝛽 < 0 and 𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝜕𝜕𝑘𝑘 < 0.  
It states that either higher foreign ownership or a smaller cost gap can increase the flexible degree of 
privatization without licensing by a foreign licensor.11  
We summarise the equilibrium outcomes under no licensing of foreign licensor in Table 1. 
<Table 1 Equilibrium results under no licensing of foreign licensor> 
 
                                           
10 Appendix C provides some proofs of Lemmas and Propositions. We omit unnecessary proofs because the 
results require only simple calculations.  
11 Wang and Chen (2011) demonstrate that the government should increase the degree of privatization when the 
equity share held by the foreign investor is increasing, which increases the profit of all private domestic enterprises 
and domestic social welfare.  
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3.2 Free licensing  
When the advanced technology is transferred to its rival firm, both the foreign and domestic private 
firms can use the same efficient technology. The cost conditions become 𝑘𝑘0 = 1 > 𝑘𝑘1 = 𝑘𝑘2 = 𝑘𝑘. We 
can set them in the equilibrium outcomes in Appendix A. Then, in the second stage, the government 
decides the degree of privatization under free licensing to maximize the social welfare in (A5): 
𝜃𝜃𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = 2(3+12𝑘𝑘+12𝑘𝑘2−2𝛽𝛽−2𝑘𝑘𝛽𝛽+4𝑘𝑘2𝛽𝛽−2𝑘𝑘𝛽𝛽2)9+50𝑘𝑘+96𝑘𝑘2+72𝑘𝑘3+16𝑘𝑘4−2𝛽𝛽+10𝑘𝑘𝛽𝛽+40𝑘𝑘2𝛽𝛽+24𝑘𝑘3𝛽𝛽−4𝑘𝑘𝛽𝛽2, (8) 
where the superscript FF indicates “free licensing by the public licensor”. 
Lemma 2. With a foreign licensor, the optimal degree of privatization under free licensing is partial; 
that is, 𝜃𝜃𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ∈ (0, 1), which is decreasing in 𝛽𝛽 and 𝑘𝑘; that is, 𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝜕𝜕𝛽𝛽 < 0 and 𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝜕𝜕𝑘𝑘 < 0.  
It states that either higher foreign ownership or a lower cost gap can increase the flexible degree of 
privatization with free licensing by a foreign licensor.  
We provide the equilibrium outcomes under free licensing to the foreign licensor in Table 2 
<Table 2 Equilibrium results under free licensing of foreign licensor> 
3.3. Comparisons  
We compare the equilibrium outcomes between no licensing and free licensing.  
Proposition 1. With a foreign licensor, the optimal degree of privatization under free licensing is always 
higher than that under no licensing; that is, 𝜃𝜃𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 > 𝜃𝜃𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁. 
This is because the domestic private firm becomes efficient under free licensing and the lower cost can 
accelerate competition and improve efficiency in the market. Additionally, as the outputs are strategic 
substitutes, the public firm can be less aggressive and produce lower outputs, which can save the total 
production cost of the public firm. Further, if the public firm is more privatized under free licensing, 
then it might mitigate competition in the product market while an efficient private firm can produce 
more, and the total production cost of the public firm will reduce further due to the output substitution 
effect. Thus, technology transfers will enhance privatization, which makes the efficient production by 
the licensee substitute for the inefficient production by the public firm and improves welfare.  
Lemma 3. (i) 𝑞𝑞0𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 < 𝑞𝑞0𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁, (ii) 𝑞𝑞1𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 > 𝑞𝑞1𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁, (iii) 𝑞𝑞2𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 < 𝑞𝑞2𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 and (iv) 𝑄𝑄𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 > 𝑄𝑄𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁. 
It states that both the public and foreign firms decrease their outputs, but the domestic firm increases its 
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output. However, more privatization induced by free licensing will increase total domestic outputs 
because the output of a domestic private firm (licensee) is greater than the sum of the reduced output of 
the public and foreign firms. Thus, in a homogeneous product market, increased total output will lower 
equilibrium prices and increase consumer surplus.12 
Lemma 4. 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 > 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁. 
Lemma 5. (i) 𝜋𝜋0𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ><𝜋𝜋0𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 , (ii) 𝜋𝜋1𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 > 𝜋𝜋1𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 and (iii) 𝜋𝜋2𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 < 𝜋𝜋2𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁. 
Lemma 3 states that the licensor and licensee can obtain opposite profits under free licensing. From 
Lemma 3, since the market price and output decrease, the foreign licensor will lose its own profit under 
free licensing while the licensee can increase output even though the market price decreases. Since both 
the inefficient public and efficient foreign firms will reduce output while the efficient licensee can 
produce more to compensate for the reduced output by the other firms, the output effect dominates the 
price effect and thus the licensee can increase its own profit. However, free licensing is profitable to the 
public firm only after privatization, when 𝛽𝛽 is large and 𝑘𝑘 is sufficiently small (See Fig. A3). 
Proposition 2. Social welfare under free licensing is always higher than that under no licensing; that is, 𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 > 𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 
Proposition 2 states that social welfare increases under free licensing because the increased degree of 
privatization can induce larger consumer surplus and higher profit for the domestic licensee, which can 
dominate the possible reduction in the public firm’s profit. 
Proposition 3. The foreign firm chooses free licensing when it has high ownership of the licensee, 
while the required level of ownership decreases as the cost gap increases; that is, 𝑉𝑉2𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ><𝑉𝑉2𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 if 𝛽𝛽 ><𝛽𝛽𝑁𝑁 
where 𝛽𝛽𝑁𝑁 ≡ 𝛽𝛽(𝑘𝑘), which satisfies 𝑉𝑉2FF = 𝑉𝑉2NF. 
[Fig. 1] Foreign firm’s objective between no licensing and free licensing 
Proposition 3 is represented by Fig. 1., which shows that the higher 𝛽𝛽 the better off the foreign firm is 
under free licensing. If the foreign firm has a high ownership, then it can recover the licensee's profit 
through passive ownership, and thus the foreign licensor has more incentive to transfer advanced 
technology. However, its incentive under free licensing decreases as the technology gap increases 
because the decreased profit of the licensor is large under a sufficiently large cost gap. Thus, the smaller 
                                           
12 Note 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = 𝑄𝑄2/2. Then, it is easy to see that CSFF > CSNF from Lemma 3 (iv) 𝑄𝑄𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 > 𝑄𝑄𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 .  
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the technology gap, the more effective it is for a foreign licensor to recover a portion of the licensee's 
profit, as given 𝛽𝛽. Otherwise, the foreign licensor chooses free licensing only when 𝛽𝛽 is sufficiently 
large, as given 𝑘𝑘.  
4. Public licensing 
In this section, we consider the public licensors’ decision and compare the equilibrium outcomes 
between no licensing and free licensing. In this case, the public firm has 𝑘𝑘0 = 𝑘𝑘, both firm 1 and firm 
2 have 𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗 = 1 (j ≠ 0) under no licensing, and firm 0 can provide free licensing to domestic firm 1, 
which results in 𝑘𝑘0 = 𝑘𝑘1 = 𝑘𝑘 < 𝑘𝑘2 = 𝑘𝑘. Again, the equilibrium outcomes of the last stage are provided 
in Appendix A. Below, we examine and compare the no licensing and free licensing cases. 
4.1 No licensing  
When the advanced technology is not transferred to its rival firm, the public firm is the only efficient 
firm while the foreign and domestic private firms are inefficient. We can set them in the equilibrium 
outcomes in Appendix A. Then, in the second stage, the government decides the degree of privatization 
under no licensing to maximize the social welfare in (A5): 
𝜃𝜃𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = 2𝑘𝑘(27−2𝛽𝛽2)2𝑘𝑘(15−𝛽𝛽)(3+2𝛽𝛽)+9(17+2𝛽𝛽), (9) 
where the superscript NP indicates “no licensing with the public licensor”. 
Lemma 6. With the public licensor, the optimal degree of privatization under no licensing is partial; 
that is, 𝜃𝜃𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ∈ (0, 1), which is decreasing in 𝛽𝛽 and 𝑘𝑘; that is, 𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝜕𝜕𝛽𝛽 < 0 and 𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝜕𝜕𝑘𝑘 > 0.  
It states that both higher foreign ownership and a higher cost gap can increase the flexible degree of 
privatization without licensing by a public licensor. Note that in contrast to foreign licensing, the 
optimal degree of privatization is increasing in the cost gap under public licensing. 
We present the equilibrium outcomes under no free licensing by the public licensor in Table 3.  
 
<Table 3 Equilibrium results under no free licensing of public licensor> 
4.2 Free licensing  
When the advanced technology is transferred to its rival firm, both foreign and domestic private firms 
can use the same efficient technology. The cost conditions become 𝑘𝑘0 = 𝑘𝑘1 = 𝑘𝑘 < 𝑘𝑘2 = 1. We can set 
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them in the equilibrium outcomes in Appendix A. Then, in the second stage, the government decides 
the degree of privatization under no licensing to maximize the social welfare in (A5): 
𝜃𝜃𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = 2𝑘𝑘(13+4𝑘𝑘2−2𝛽𝛽(1+𝛽𝛽)+2𝑘𝑘(5+𝛽𝛽))3(5+4𝛽𝛽)+4𝑘𝑘(23+8𝑘𝑘2+(8−𝛽𝛽)𝛽𝛽+𝑘𝑘(26+7𝛽𝛽)), (10) 
where the superscript FP indicates “free licensing by the public licensor”.  
Lemma 7. With the public licensor, the optimal degree of privatization under free licensing is partial; 
that is, 𝜃𝜃𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ∈ (0, 1), which is decreasing in 𝛽𝛽 but increasing in 𝑘𝑘; that is, 𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝜕𝜕𝛽𝛽 < 0 and 𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝜕𝜕𝑘𝑘 > 0.  
It states that both higher foreign ownership and a higher cost gap can increase the flexible degree of 
privatization with free licensing by a public licensor. Note that in contrast to foreign licensing, the 
optimal degree of privatization is increasing in the cost gap under public licensing. 
We report the equilibrium outcomes under free licensing by the public licensor in Table 4.  
<Table 4 Equilibrium results under free licensing of public licensor> 
4.3 Comparisons  
We now compare the equilibrium outcomes between no licensing and free licensing.  
Proposition 4. With a public licensing contract, the optimal degree of privatization under free licensing 
is always higher than that under no licensing; that is, 𝜃𝜃𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 > 𝜃𝜃𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 
The economic explanation is the same as for Proposition 1. The domestic private firm becomes efficient 
under free licensing and this cost efficiency can accelerate competition in the market. Because the public 
firm produces less output, the total production cost of the public firm also declines. If the public firm is 
more privatized under free licensing, then an efficient private firm can produce more and the total 
production cost of the public firm will reduce further. Thus, technology transfers will enhance 
privatization, which will increase welfare. 
Lemma 8 (i) 𝑞𝑞0𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 < 𝑞𝑞0𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁, (ii) 𝑞𝑞1𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 > 𝑞𝑞1𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁, (iii) 𝑞𝑞2𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ><𝑞𝑞2𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 and (iv) 𝑄𝑄𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ><𝑄𝑄𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁. 
It states that the public firm decreases its outputs while the domestic firm increases its output. However, 
the foreign firm’s output depends on 𝛽𝛽 and 𝑘𝑘. In particular, Fig. A6 shows that it can increase the 
output under free licensing when both 𝛽𝛽 and 𝑘𝑘 are sufficiently small. This is because the public firm 
will be more privatized, which increases the output of not only the domestic licensee but the foreign 
firm due to the output substitution effect. Fig. A6 also shows that the total industry outputs under free 
licensing can increase when either 𝛽𝛽 is large or 𝑘𝑘 is large. This is because the output increase by the 
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domestic licensee outweighs the decreased output of the public and foreign firms. It also implies that 
the market price and consumer surplus also depend on foreign ownership and the technological gap. 
The change in total industry output exactly implies the change in consumer surplus, as Fig. A7 shows. 
Lemma 9. 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ><𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁. 
Lemma 9 states that consumer surplus increases under free licensing unless both 𝛽𝛽 and 𝑘𝑘 are small.  
Lemma 10. (i) 𝜋𝜋0𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ><𝜋𝜋0𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁, (ii) 𝜋𝜋1𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 > 𝜋𝜋1𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 and (iii) 𝜋𝜋2𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ><𝜋𝜋2𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁. 
Lemma 10 states that the domestic licensee can increase its profit from free licensing while the profits 
of the rival firms depend on 𝛽𝛽 and 𝑘𝑘. In particular, Fig. A8 shows that both firms can increase their 
profits under free licensing when both 𝛽𝛽 and 𝑘𝑘 are small. This is because the public firm will be more 
privatized, which decreases its output while increasing the output of both the domestic licensee and the 
foreign firm. From Lemma 8, since the market price increases, the domestic licensee and foreign firm 
will obtain higher profit under free licensing when both 𝛽𝛽 and 𝑘𝑘 are small. On the other hand, the 
public licensee decreases its output, but the market price effect dominates the output effect and thus the 
public licensor can also increase its own profit when both 𝛽𝛽 and 𝑘𝑘 are small. However, free licensing 
is profitable to the domestic licensee only when either 𝛽𝛽 is large or 𝑘𝑘 is large. 
From Lemmas 9 and 10, we can see a trade-off between consumer surplus and the profit of the public 
firm. In particular, consumer surplus increases while the public firm’s profit decreases under free 
licensing when either 𝛽𝛽 is large or 𝑘𝑘 is large, and vice versa otherwise. 
Proposition 5. Social welfare under free licensing is always higher than that under no licensing; that is, 𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 > 𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁. 
This proposition indicates that social welfare increases under free licensing because the higher degree 
of privatization can induce higher profit for the domestic licensee while there is a trade-off between 
increased (decreased) consumer surplus and decreased (increased) profit for the public firm. 
Proposition 6 The public firm chooses free licensing when the technology gap is small and the required 
level of technology gap is non-monotone in the foreign ownership of the licensee; that is, 𝑉𝑉0𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ><𝑉𝑉0𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 if 𝛽𝛽 ><𝛽𝛽𝑁𝑁, where 𝛽𝛽𝑁𝑁 ≡ 𝛽𝛽(𝑘𝑘), which satisfies 𝑉𝑉0FP = 𝑉𝑉0NP. 
[Fig. 2] Public licensors objective between free licensing and no free licensing 
Proposition 6 is represented by Fig. 2, which shows that that the higher the value of 𝑘𝑘, the better the 
public firm is under free licensing. It implies that if the cost gap is small, then free licensing improves 
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welfare but decreases profit. Because the increased degree of privatization is small in that case, the 
increased welfare outweighs the decreased profit. Note that the incentive for free licensing by the public 
firm is not significantly affected by 𝛽𝛽 unless 𝛽𝛽 is sufficiently large. However, the public licensor will 
not transfer technology, even if there is a small technological gap, if 𝛽𝛽 is sufficiently large. This is 
because all the higher profit will flow out to the foreign firm. Note also that the incentive for free 
licensing decreases as the technology gap increases; that is, when 𝑘𝑘 is close to 0, because the public 
should care more about welfare under a low degree of privatization in that case, but consumer surplus 
decreases when the cost gap is sufficiently large. 
5. Discussions  
5.1 Comparison between foreign and public licensing contracts 
We can first compare the licensor’s incentives for free licensing from Proposition 3 and 6. Specifically, 
from Fig. 1 and Fig. 2, we can identify four different regions from the comparisons of the licensor’s 
objective. In Fig. 3, the bold black line represents the threshold of the foreign licensing, while the dotted 
red line represents the threshold of public licensing. 
Fig. 3 demonstrates that the licensor’s choice of free licensing depends crucially on the correlations 
between the foreign ownership share and technology efficiency gap. If 𝛽𝛽  and 𝑘𝑘  have positive 
correlations, in particular, then the foreign licensor and public licensor have no licensing in case 2, 
where both 𝛽𝛽 and 𝑘𝑘 are small enough, and free licensing in case 3, where both 𝛽𝛽 and 𝑘𝑘 are large 
enough. However, if 𝛽𝛽  and 𝑘𝑘  have negative correlations, then the licensor’s incentives for free 
licensing differ. In particular, the public firm does not transfer technology in case 1, where 𝛽𝛽 is large 
but 𝑘𝑘 is small, while the foreign firm does not transfer technology in case 4, where 𝛽𝛽 is small but 𝑘𝑘 
is large. However, from the welfare perspective, free licensing can always improve welfare.  
 
[Fig.3] Comparisons between foreign and public licensing contracts 
Proposition 7. If both 𝛽𝛽 and 𝑘𝑘 are large (small) enough, then the licensor always (never) chooses 
free licensing under foreign and public licensing contracts. 
From these findings, we can provide a few policy suggestions regarding free licensing contracts. First, 
if 𝛽𝛽 is large but 𝑘𝑘 is small, and thus the technology gap is large (Case 1 where the public firm does 
not transfer technology, but the foreign firm does), then the government should monitor the free 
licensing decision of the public firm before privatization. Second, if 𝛽𝛽 is small but 𝑘𝑘 is large, and 
thus foreign ownership is low (Case 4 where the foreign firm does not transfer technology, but the public 
13 
 
firm does), then the government may allow the foreign firm to obtain a higher portion of the shares of 
domestic firms under passive ownership (if it does not affect anticompetitive behaviours of the foreign 
firm). Finally, if both 𝛽𝛽 and 𝑘𝑘 are small (Case 2 where both the public and foreign firms do not 
transfer technology), then it should encourage free licensing contracts before privatization. 
5.2 Open technology 
We now consider the open technology case in which the licensor transfers advanced technology to 
all firms in the market. Under both foreign and public licensing, the cost conditions become 𝑘𝑘0 = 𝑘𝑘1 =𝑘𝑘2 = 𝑘𝑘 < 1. We can set them in the equilibrium outcomes in Appendix A. Then, in the second stage, 
the government decides the degree of privatization under no licensing to maximize the social welfare 
in (A5): 
𝜃𝜃OT = 2𝑘𝑘(3−2𝛽𝛽+2𝑘𝑘(2+2𝑘𝑘−𝛽𝛽)(3+𝛽𝛽))3+4𝑘𝑘(7+𝑘𝑘(21+8𝑘𝑘(3+𝑘𝑘)+4𝛽𝛽+2𝑘𝑘(5+2𝑘𝑘)𝛽𝛽−𝛽𝛽2)), (11) 
where the superscript OT indicates “open technology by the licensor”.  
Lemma 11. The optimal degree of privatization under open technology is partial; that is, 𝜃𝜃𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 ∈ (0, 1), 
which is decreasing in 𝛽𝛽 but increasing in 𝑘𝑘; that is, 𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝜕𝜕𝛽𝛽 < 0 and 𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝜕𝜕𝑘𝑘 > 0. 
It states that higher foreign ownership or a higher cost gap can increase the flexible degree of 
privatization under open technology. Note that like public licensing, the optimal degree of privatization 
is increasing in the cost gap under open technology. 
We present the equilibrium outcomes under open technology in Table 5.  
<Table 5 Equilibrium results under open technology> 
Proposition 8. The optimal degree of privatization under open technology is the lowest (highest) under 
a foreign (public) licensing contract; that is, 𝜃𝜃FF > 𝜃𝜃NF > 𝜃𝜃OT > 𝜃𝜃FP > 𝜃𝜃NP. 
Proposition 8 shows an interesting finding that open technology yields different incentives for 
privatization for the government. The case with a foreign licensor, where the public firm can be efficient, 
should have the lowest optimal degree of privatization because the welfare-oriented public firm is 
desirable to society from the viewpoint of welfare. The case with a public licensor, however, where the 
foreign firm can be an efficient rival, should have the highest optimal degree of privatization because 
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the higher competition with more privatized firms can increase total industry output and improve 
welfare.13 
Finally, we examine the incentive for open technology for the public and foreign licensors, 
respectively, and compare the welfare consequences. First, we consider the incentive of the foreign 
licensor and compare the welfare outcomes.  
Proposition 9. The foreign firm will not choose open technology while the welfare is higher under open 
technology; that is, (i) 𝑉𝑉2NF > 𝑉𝑉2OT and 𝑉𝑉2FF > 𝑉𝑉2OT, while (ii) 𝑊𝑊OT > 𝑊𝑊FF > 𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁.. 
This implies that open technology is not an option for the foreign firm, while that is always socially 
desirable for society. It is therefore necessary for the government to induce the foreign licensor to 
implement open technology when it enters market. 
Second, we consider the incentive of the public licensor and compare the welfare outcomes.  
Proposition 10. The public firm will not choose open technology while welfare can be higher under 
open technology; that is, (i) 𝑉𝑉0𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 > 𝑉𝑉0𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂, while (ii) 𝑊𝑊𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 ><𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 and 𝑊𝑊𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 > 𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁. 
This implies that open technology is not an option for the public firm. Without considering open 
technology, from Propositions 5 and 6, we show that the public firm chooses free licensing only when 
the technology gap is small, but free licensing is always welfare-improving. Proposition 10 (i) also 
states that even with open technology, the public firm’s optimal choice is the same. However, 
Proposition 10 (ii) is represented by Fig. A11, which shows that free licensing is socially desirable only 
when both 𝛽𝛽 and 𝑘𝑘 are small, while open technology is otherwise. Therefore, the government must 
regulate the public licensor to adopt open technology rather than free licensing, except when both 𝛽𝛽 
and 𝑘𝑘 are small. 
6. Concluding remarks 
We investigated and compared free licensing strategies by a foreign and public licensor, respectively, 
under the flexible choice of privatization policy in a mixed oligopoly in which a public firm competes 
with two private domestic and foreign firms under passive ownership. We showed that when the 
licensor transfers its advanced technology to the domestic firm, the licensee’s production cost reduction 
accelerates competition in the production market, which induces the government to increase the degree 
                                           
13 We can show that 𝑞𝑞0OT >< 𝑞𝑞0FP, 𝑞𝑞1OT < 𝑞𝑞1FP, 𝑞𝑞2OT > 𝑞𝑞2FP and 𝑄𝑄OT > 𝑄𝑄FP, which implies that more privatization 
can increase consumer surplus under open technology. On this point, De Fraja and Delbono (1989) also show that 
more competition with privatization improves welfare. 
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of privatization. Consequently, free licensing can increase the domestic private firm’s profit and welfare, 
but the incentive for free licensing differs for the foreign licensor and the public licensor.  
We showed that with a foreign licensor, the free licensing strategy can be chosen only when the 
foreign ownership share of the licensee is high, but the required ownership share increases as the 
efficiency gap between the licensor and licensee increases. Therefore, with a significant amount of 
foreign ownership, the easing of privatization induced by free licensing will increase social welfare. 
However, with a public licensor, free licensing can be chosen only when the cost gap is relatively low, 
irrespective of foreign ownership share.  
We further showed that the optimal degree of privatization under a foreign licensor is always higher 
than that under a public licensor. This finding implies that a foreign licensor creates more motivations 
for privatization, but state-owned enterprises may act as implicit industrial policies. Such policies aim 
to extract advanced technologies from foreign firms to improve the productivity of domestic firms or 
to prevent the outflow of domestic capital to foreign countries by improving the productivity of 
domestic firms. 
Finally, we examined open technology, where all firms in the market have the same technology and 
found a contrasting result: the optimal degree of privatization under open technology is the lowest 
(highest) under foreign (public) licensing contracts. However, neither the foreign nor public licensors 
adopt open technology, even if it may be socially desirable. It is therefore necessary for the government 
to induce the licensor to adopt open technology under certain regulations. 
As future research, we can extend the model with more general forms such as differentiated products, 
different market structures, and heterogenous objective functions for the firms. Additionally, future 
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Appendix A: The equilibrium outcomes of the last stage 
Each firm simultaneously chooses its output to maximize its objective equation (4), (5) and (6). The 
first order conditions are as follows:  
𝜕𝜕𝑉𝑉0𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞0 = 𝑎𝑎 − (1 + 𝜃𝜃 + 2𝑘𝑘0)𝑞𝑞0 − (1 − 𝛽𝛽 + 𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃)𝑞𝑞1 − 𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞2 = 0  𝜕𝜕𝑉𝑉1𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞1 = (1 − 𝛽𝛽)(𝑎𝑎 − 𝑞𝑞0 − 2(1 + 𝑘𝑘1)𝑞𝑞1 − 𝑞𝑞2) = 0  𝜕𝜕𝑉𝑉2𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞2 = 𝑎𝑎 − 𝑞𝑞0 − (1 + 𝛽𝛽)𝑞𝑞1 − 2(1 + 𝑘𝑘2)𝑞𝑞2 = 0 
(A1) 
Then, we obtain the following equilibrium output levels.14  
𝑞𝑞0 = 𝑆𝑆(2−𝜃𝜃)(1+2𝑘𝑘1)+2𝑆𝑆(1+𝛽𝛽−𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃+2𝑘𝑘1)𝑘𝑘22+(2−𝛽𝛽)𝜃𝜃+2(1+𝛽𝛽+(2−𝛽𝛽)𝜃𝜃)𝑘𝑘2+2𝑘𝑘1(2+𝜃𝜃+2(1+𝜃𝜃)𝑘𝑘2)+2𝑘𝑘0(3−𝛽𝛽+4𝑘𝑘2+4𝑘𝑘1(1+𝑘𝑘2)), 𝑞𝑞1 = 𝑆𝑆(𝜃𝜃+2𝑘𝑘0)(1+2𝑘𝑘2)2+(2−𝛽𝛽)𝜃𝜃+2(1+𝛽𝛽+(2−𝛽𝛽)𝜃𝜃)𝑘𝑘2+2𝑘𝑘1(2+𝜃𝜃+2(1+𝜃𝜃)𝑘𝑘2)+2𝑘𝑘0(3−𝛽𝛽+4𝑘𝑘2+4𝑘𝑘1(1+𝑘𝑘2))  𝑞𝑞2 = 𝑆𝑆(𝜃𝜃+2𝑘𝑘0)(1−𝛽𝛽+2𝑘𝑘1)2+(2−𝛽𝛽)𝜃𝜃+2(1+𝛽𝛽+(2−𝛽𝛽)𝜃𝜃)𝑘𝑘2+2𝑘𝑘1(2+𝜃𝜃+2(1+𝜃𝜃)𝑘𝑘2)+2𝑘𝑘0(3−𝛽𝛽+4𝑘𝑘2+4𝑘𝑘1(1+𝑘𝑘2))  𝑄𝑄 = 𝑆𝑆(2+(1−𝛽𝛽)𝜃𝜃+2𝑘𝑘0(2−𝛽𝛽+2𝑘𝑘1+2𝑘𝑘2)+2(1+𝛽𝛽+(1−𝛽𝛽)𝜃𝜃)𝑘𝑘2+4𝑘𝑘1(1+𝑘𝑘2))2+(2−𝛽𝛽)𝜃𝜃+2(1+𝛽𝛽+(2−𝛽𝛽)𝜃𝜃)𝑘𝑘2+2𝑘𝑘1(2+𝜃𝜃+2(1+𝜃𝜃)𝑘𝑘2)+2𝑘𝑘0(3−𝛽𝛽+4𝑘𝑘2+4𝑘𝑘1(1+𝑘𝑘2))  
(A2) 
Substituting the equilibrium outcomes yields the following results.  
𝜋𝜋0 = 𝑆𝑆2((2−𝜃𝜃)(1+2𝑘𝑘1)+2(1+𝛽𝛽−𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃+2𝑘𝑘1)𝑘𝑘2)(𝜃𝜃(1+𝑘𝑘0)(1+2𝑘𝑘1)+2(𝜃𝜃+(1−𝛽𝛽(1−𝜃𝜃))𝑘𝑘0+2(𝜃𝜃+𝑘𝑘0)𝑘𝑘1)𝑘𝑘2)(2+(2−𝛽𝛽)𝜃𝜃+2(1+𝛽𝛽+(2−𝛽𝛽)𝜃𝜃)𝑘𝑘2+2𝑘𝑘1(2+𝜃𝜃+2(1+𝜃𝜃)𝑘𝑘2)+2𝑘𝑘0(3−𝛽𝛽+4𝑘𝑘2+4𝑘𝑘1(1+𝑘𝑘2)))2   𝜋𝜋1 = 𝑆𝑆2(𝜃𝜃+2𝑘𝑘0)2(1+𝑘𝑘1)(1+2𝑘𝑘2)2(2+(2−𝛽𝛽)𝜃𝜃+2(1+𝛽𝛽+(2−𝛽𝛽)𝜃𝜃)𝑘𝑘2+2𝑘𝑘1(2+𝜃𝜃+2(1+𝜃𝜃)𝑘𝑘2)+2𝑘𝑘0(3−𝛽𝛽+4𝑘𝑘2+4𝑘𝑘1(1+𝑘𝑘2)))2  𝜋𝜋2 = 𝑆𝑆2(𝜃𝜃+2𝑘𝑘0)2(1−𝛽𝛽+2𝑘𝑘1)(1+(1+𝛽𝛽)𝑘𝑘2+2𝑘𝑘1(1+𝑘𝑘2))(2+(2−𝛽𝛽)𝜃𝜃+2(1+𝛽𝛽+(2−𝛽𝛽)𝜃𝜃)𝑘𝑘2+2𝑘𝑘1(2+𝜃𝜃+2(1+𝜃𝜃)𝑘𝑘2)+2𝑘𝑘0(3−𝛽𝛽+4𝑘𝑘2+4𝑘𝑘1(1+𝑘𝑘2)))2  
(A3) 
The consumer surplus social welfare can be obtained as follows. 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = 𝑆𝑆2(2+(1−𝛽𝛽)𝜃𝜃+2𝑘𝑘0(2−𝛽𝛽+2𝑘𝑘1+2𝑘𝑘2)+2(1+𝛽𝛽+(1−𝛽𝛽)𝜃𝜃)𝑘𝑘2+4𝑘𝑘1(1+𝑘𝑘2))22(2+(2−𝛽𝛽)𝜃𝜃+2(1+𝛽𝛽+(2−𝛽𝛽)𝜃𝜃)𝑘𝑘2+2𝑘𝑘1(2+𝜃𝜃+2(1+𝜃𝜃)𝑘𝑘2)+2𝑘𝑘0(3−𝛽𝛽+4𝑘𝑘2+4𝑘𝑘1(1+𝑘𝑘2)))2  (A4) 
𝑊𝑊 = 𝑎𝑎2(212+(116−31𝜃𝜃)𝜃𝜃+𝛽𝛽2(2+𝜃𝜃)2−6𝛽𝛽(2+𝜃𝜃)(6+𝜃𝜃)+4𝑘𝑘(104−2𝛽𝛽(9+𝛽𝛽)+62𝜃𝜃−(21−𝛽𝛽)𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃−(4+(15−𝛽𝛽)𝛽𝛽)𝜃𝜃2)+4𝑘𝑘2(59−𝛽𝛽2(1−𝜃𝜃)2−6𝛽𝛽(1+𝜃𝜃)(1+2𝜃𝜃)+𝜃𝜃(44+5𝜃𝜃)))2(2+(2−𝛽𝛽)𝜃𝜃+2(1+𝛽𝛽+(2−𝛽𝛽)𝜃𝜃)𝑘𝑘2+2𝑘𝑘1(2+𝜃𝜃+2(1+𝜃𝜃)𝑘𝑘2)+2𝑘𝑘0(3−𝛽𝛽+4𝑘𝑘2+4𝑘𝑘1(1+𝑘𝑘2)))2  (A5) 
                                           
14 Note that 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 > 0 (𝑖𝑖 = 0, 1, 2) for any 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 and 𝛽𝛽 in [0, 1], and the second-order conditions are satisfied. 
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The objectives of each firm are as follows.  
𝑉𝑉0 = 𝐴𝐴12(2+2𝜃𝜃−𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃+2(1+𝛽𝛽+2𝜃𝜃−𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃)𝑘𝑘2+2𝑘𝑘1(2+𝜃𝜃+2(1+𝜃𝜃)𝑘𝑘2)+𝑘𝑘0(6−2𝛽𝛽+8𝑘𝑘2+8𝑘𝑘1(1+𝑘𝑘2)))2  𝑉𝑉1 = 𝑆𝑆2(1−𝛽𝛽)(𝜃𝜃+2𝑘𝑘0)2(1+𝑘𝑘1)(1+2𝑘𝑘2)22(2+(2−𝛽𝛽)𝜃𝜃+2(1+𝛽𝛽+(2−𝛽𝛽)𝜃𝜃)𝑘𝑘2+2𝑘𝑘1(2+𝜃𝜃+2(1+𝜃𝜃)𝑘𝑘2)+2𝑘𝑘0(3−𝛽𝛽+4𝑘𝑘2+4𝑘𝑘1(1+𝑘𝑘2)))2  𝑉𝑉2 = 𝑆𝑆2(𝜃𝜃+2𝑘𝑘0)2(1+𝑘𝑘2+(𝑘𝑘1+𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘2)(4−𝛽𝛽+4𝑘𝑘2+4𝑘𝑘1(1+𝑘𝑘2)))2(2+(2−𝛽𝛽)𝜃𝜃+2(1+𝛽𝛽+(2−𝛽𝛽)𝜃𝜃)𝑘𝑘2+2𝑘𝑘1(2+𝜃𝜃+2(1+𝜃𝜃)𝑘𝑘2)+2𝑘𝑘0(3−𝛽𝛽+4𝑘𝑘2+4𝑘𝑘1(1+𝑘𝑘2)))2  
(A6) 
where 𝐴𝐴1 = 𝑎𝑎2(4 + 𝜃𝜃(4 − 4𝛽𝛽 − (3 − 𝛽𝛽2)𝜃𝜃 − (3− 𝛽𝛽)(1− 𝛽𝛽)𝜃𝜃2) + 2𝑘𝑘1�8 + 𝜃𝜃�4 − 𝛽𝛽(1− 𝜃𝜃)(4 + 𝜃𝜃) − 𝜃𝜃(7 + 𝜃𝜃)�+ 4(2− 𝜃𝜃2)𝑘𝑘1�+
8𝑘𝑘2 + 4 �(1 − 𝜃𝜃)(2𝛽𝛽 + (4− 𝛽𝛽 − 𝛽𝛽2)𝜃𝜃 + (3− 𝛽𝛽)(1− 𝛽𝛽)𝜃𝜃2) + 2𝑘𝑘1�4 + (1− 𝜃𝜃)𝜃𝜃(5 + 𝜃𝜃) − 𝛽𝛽�2− 𝜃𝜃(4 − 𝜃𝜃 − 𝜃𝜃2)� −
2(2− 𝜃𝜃)(1 + 𝜃𝜃)𝑘𝑘1��𝑘𝑘2 + 4�1 + 𝛽𝛽2(1− 𝜃𝜃)3 + 2𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜃𝜃)2(1 + 2𝜃𝜃) + 𝜃𝜃(3 + 𝜃𝜃 − 3𝜃𝜃2) + 2𝑘𝑘1(2 + 𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜃𝜃)(2− 𝜃𝜃2) +𝜃𝜃(4 − 𝜃𝜃 − 𝜃𝜃2) + 2(1 + 𝜃𝜃)𝑘𝑘1)�𝑘𝑘22 + 4(1− 𝜃𝜃)𝑘𝑘02 �6− (6− 𝛽𝛽)𝛽𝛽 + 4𝑘𝑘12 + 4𝑘𝑘2(4− 3𝛽𝛽 + (3 − 2𝛽𝛽)𝑘𝑘2) + 2𝑘𝑘1�5− 3𝛽𝛽 −
4𝑘𝑘2(2− 𝛽𝛽 + (1− 𝛽𝛽)𝑘𝑘2)��+ 2𝑘𝑘0 �8− 4𝛽𝛽 + 2(1− (3− 𝛽𝛽)𝛽𝛽)𝜃𝜃 − (9− 2(5− 𝛽𝛽)𝛽𝛽)𝜃𝜃2 + 4𝑘𝑘2(5− 𝛽𝛽2(1− 𝜃𝜃)2 + (3− 7𝜃𝜃)𝜃𝜃 −
7𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝜃𝜃 + (3 + 2𝛽𝛽 − 𝛽𝛽2 + 2(2 − (4 − 𝛽𝛽)𝛽𝛽)𝜃𝜃 − (6 − (6 − 𝛽𝛽)𝛽𝛽)𝜃𝜃2)𝑘𝑘2) + 4𝑘𝑘12(4− 𝜃𝜃(2 + 𝜃𝜃) + 4(2− 𝜃𝜃 + 𝑘𝑘2)𝑘𝑘2) +
4𝑘𝑘1�6− 𝜃𝜃(2 + 3𝜃𝜃) − 2𝛽𝛽(1− 𝜃𝜃2) + 2𝑘𝑘2(7− 𝛽𝛽(1− 𝜃𝜃)(1 + 2𝜃𝜃) − 𝜃𝜃(2 + 3𝜃𝜃) + 2(2 − 𝛽𝛽(1− 𝜃𝜃)𝜃𝜃 − 𝜃𝜃2)𝑘𝑘2)��) 
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Table 1 Equilibrium results under no licensing of foreign licensor 
𝑞𝑞0𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = 𝑆𝑆(1+2𝑘𝑘)(29−2𝛽𝛽+𝑘𝑘(22+8𝛽𝛽))127+4𝑘𝑘(76−7𝛽𝛽)−2(15−𝛽𝛽)𝛽𝛽+4𝑘𝑘2(43+4𝛽𝛽)  𝑞𝑞2𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = 2𝑆𝑆(3−𝛽𝛽)(7+8𝑘𝑘−𝛽𝛽)127+4𝑘𝑘(76−7𝛽𝛽)−2(15−𝛽𝛽)𝛽𝛽+4𝑘𝑘2(43+4𝛽𝛽)  𝜋𝜋0𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 =  𝑆𝑆2(1+2𝑘𝑘)3(13−4𝛽𝛽)(29−2𝛽𝛽+𝑘𝑘(22+8𝛽𝛽))(127+4𝑘𝑘(76−7𝛽𝛽)−2(15−𝛽𝛽)𝛽𝛽+4𝑘𝑘2(43+4𝛽𝛽))2  𝜋𝜋2𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = 4𝑆𝑆2(3−𝛽𝛽)(7+8𝑘𝑘−𝛽𝛽)2(3+𝑘𝑘(3+𝛽𝛽))(127+4𝑘𝑘(76−7𝛽𝛽)−2(15−𝛽𝛽)𝛽𝛽+4𝑘𝑘2(43+4𝛽𝛽))2  
𝑞𝑞1𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = 2𝑆𝑆(1+2𝑘𝑘)(7+8𝑘𝑘−𝛽𝛽)127+4𝑘𝑘(76−7𝛽𝛽)−2(15−𝛽𝛽)𝛽𝛽+4𝑘𝑘2(43+4𝛽𝛽)  𝑄𝑄𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = 𝑆𝑆(85+4𝑘𝑘(43−4𝛽𝛽)−2(12−𝛽𝛽)𝛽𝛽+4𝑘𝑘2(19+4𝛽𝛽))127+4𝑘𝑘(76−7𝛽𝛽)−2(15−𝛽𝛽)𝛽𝛽+4𝑘𝑘2(43+4𝛽𝛽)   𝜋𝜋1𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = 8𝑆𝑆2(1+2𝑘𝑘)2(7+8𝑘𝑘−𝛽𝛽)2(127+4𝑘𝑘(76−7𝛽𝛽)−2(15−𝛽𝛽)𝛽𝛽+4𝑘𝑘2(43+4𝛽𝛽))2  
𝑉𝑉0NF = 𝐴𝐴2(127+4𝑘𝑘(76−7𝛽𝛽)−2(15−𝛽𝛽)𝛽𝛽+4𝑘𝑘2(43+4𝛽𝛽))2(71−8𝛽𝛽+4𝑘𝑘(32+(8−𝛽𝛽)𝛽𝛽+𝑘𝑘(11+12𝛽𝛽)))  𝑉𝑉1𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 =  8𝑆𝑆2(1+2𝑘𝑘)2(1−𝛽𝛽)(7+8𝑘𝑘−𝛽𝛽)2(127+4𝑘𝑘(76−7𝛽𝛽)−2(15−𝛽𝛽)𝛽𝛽+4𝑘𝑘2(43+4𝛽𝛽))2  𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = 𝑆𝑆2(85+4𝑘𝑘(43−4𝛽𝛽)−2(12−𝛽𝛽)𝛽𝛽+4𝑘𝑘2(19+4𝛽𝛽))22(127+4𝑘𝑘(76−7𝛽𝛽)−2(15−𝛽𝛽)𝛽𝛽+4𝑘𝑘2(43+4𝛽𝛽))2  
𝑉𝑉2𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = 4𝑆𝑆2(7+8𝑘𝑘−𝛽𝛽)2(9−𝛽𝛽+𝑘𝑘(9+(8+8𝑘𝑘−𝛽𝛽)𝛽𝛽))(127+4𝑘𝑘(76−7𝛽𝛽)−2(15−𝛽𝛽)𝛽𝛽+4𝑘𝑘2(43+4𝛽𝛽))2  𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = 𝑆𝑆2(69+𝑘𝑘2(84−16𝛽𝛽)+36𝑘𝑘(4−𝛽𝛽)−2(13−𝛽𝛽)𝛽𝛽)254+8𝑘𝑘(76−7𝛽𝛽)−4(15−𝛽𝛽)𝛽𝛽+8𝑘𝑘2(43+4𝛽𝛽)   𝐴𝐴2 = 𝑎𝑎2(1 + 2𝑘𝑘)(413939− 4𝛽𝛽(63789 − 𝛽𝛽(13857− (1292− 45𝛽𝛽)𝛽𝛽)) + 32𝑘𝑘5(8699 + 4𝛽𝛽(2519− 4𝛽𝛽(79 + 12𝛽𝛽))) +
16𝑘𝑘4(102739 + 4𝛽𝛽(14951− 𝛽𝛽(4611 + 8𝛽𝛽(11− 2𝛽𝛽)))) + 16𝑘𝑘3(228223 + 4𝛽𝛽(10596− 𝛽𝛽(8868− 𝛽𝛽(665 + 12𝛽𝛽)))) +






Table 2 Equilibrium results under free licensing of foreign licensor 
𝑞𝑞0𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = 𝑆𝑆(1+2𝑘𝑘)2(3+2𝑘𝑘(5+2𝑘𝑘+𝛽𝛽))(1+2𝑘𝑘)2(21+2𝑘𝑘(17+6𝑘𝑘))−2(1+2𝑘𝑘)(6+𝑘𝑘(3−2𝑘𝑘))𝛽𝛽+2𝛽𝛽2  𝑞𝑞2𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = 2𝑆𝑆(1+2𝑘𝑘−𝛽𝛽)(3+4𝑘𝑘(2+𝑘𝑘)−𝛽𝛽)(1+2𝑘𝑘)2(21+2𝑘𝑘(17+6𝑘𝑘))−2(1+2𝑘𝑘)(6+𝑘𝑘(3−2𝑘𝑘))𝛽𝛽+2𝛽𝛽2  𝜋𝜋0𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 =  𝑆𝑆2(1+2𝑘𝑘)4(3+6𝑘𝑘+4𝑘𝑘2−2(1+𝑘𝑘)𝛽𝛽)(3+2𝑘𝑘(5+2𝑘𝑘+𝛽𝛽))((1+2𝑘𝑘)2(21+2𝑘𝑘(17+6𝑘𝑘))−2(1+2𝑘𝑘)(6+𝑘𝑘(3−2𝑘𝑘))𝛽𝛽+2𝛽𝛽2)2   
𝑞𝑞1𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = 2𝑆𝑆(1+2𝑘𝑘)(3+4𝑘𝑘(2+𝑘𝑘)−𝛽𝛽)(1+2𝑘𝑘)2(21+2𝑘𝑘(17+6𝑘𝑘))−2(1+2𝑘𝑘)(6+𝑘𝑘(3−2𝑘𝑘))𝛽𝛽+2𝛽𝛽2  𝑄𝑄𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = 𝑆𝑆((1+2𝑘𝑘)2(15+2𝑘𝑘(9+2𝑘𝑘))−2(5+11𝑘𝑘−4𝑘𝑘3)𝛽𝛽+2𝛽𝛽2)
(1+2𝑘𝑘)2(21+2𝑘𝑘(17+6𝑘𝑘))−2(1+2𝑘𝑘)(6+𝑘𝑘(3−2𝑘𝑘))𝛽𝛽+2𝛽𝛽2  𝜋𝜋1𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = 4𝑆𝑆2(1+𝑘𝑘)(1+2𝑘𝑘)2(−3−4𝑘𝑘(2+𝑘𝑘)+𝛽𝛽)2((1+2𝑘𝑘)2(21+2𝑘𝑘(17+6𝑘𝑘))−2(1+2𝑘𝑘)(6+𝑘𝑘(3−2𝑘𝑘))𝛽𝛽+2𝛽𝛽2)2  𝜋𝜋2𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = 4𝑆𝑆2(1+2𝑘𝑘−𝛽𝛽)(3+4𝑘𝑘(2+𝑘𝑘)−𝛽𝛽)2(1+𝑘𝑘(3+2𝑘𝑘+𝛽𝛽))((1+2𝑘𝑘)2(21+2𝑘𝑘(17+6𝑘𝑘))−2(1+2𝑘𝑘)(6+𝑘𝑘(3−2𝑘𝑘))𝛽𝛽+2𝛽𝛽2)2  𝑉𝑉0𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = 𝐴𝐴32((1+2𝑘𝑘)2(21+2𝑘𝑘(17+6𝑘𝑘))+2(1+2𝑘𝑘)(−6+𝑘𝑘(−3+2𝑘𝑘))𝛽𝛽+2𝛽𝛽2)2(9−2𝛽𝛽+2𝑘𝑘(4𝑘𝑘(12+𝑘𝑘(9+2𝑘𝑘))+4𝑘𝑘(5+3𝑘𝑘)𝛽𝛽−2𝛽𝛽2+5(5+𝛽𝛽)))  𝑉𝑉1𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = 4𝑆𝑆2(1+𝑘𝑘)(1+2𝑘𝑘)2(1−𝛽𝛽)(3+4𝑘𝑘(2+𝑘𝑘)−𝛽𝛽)2((1+2𝑘𝑘)2(21+2𝑘𝑘(17+6𝑘𝑘))−2(1+2𝑘𝑘)(6+𝑘𝑘(3−2𝑘𝑘))𝛽𝛽+2𝛽𝛽2)2  𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = 𝑆𝑆2((1+2𝑘𝑘)2(15+2𝑘𝑘(9+2𝑘𝑘))−2(5+11𝑘𝑘−4𝑘𝑘3)𝛽𝛽+2𝛽𝛽2)22((1+2𝑘𝑘)2(21+2𝑘𝑘(17+6𝑘𝑘))−2(1+2𝑘𝑘)(6+𝑘𝑘(3−2𝑘𝑘))𝛽𝛽+2𝛽𝛽2)2  𝑉𝑉2
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = 4𝑆𝑆2(3+4𝑘𝑘(2+𝑘𝑘)−𝛽𝛽)2(1+𝑘𝑘(5+(3−𝛽𝛽)𝛽𝛽+8𝑘𝑘(1+𝛽𝛽)+4𝑘𝑘2(1+𝛽𝛽)))
((1+2𝑘𝑘)2(21+2𝑘𝑘(17+6𝑘𝑘))−2(1+2𝑘𝑘)(6+𝑘𝑘(3−2𝑘𝑘))𝛽𝛽+2𝛽𝛽2)2   𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = 𝑆𝑆2((1+2𝑘𝑘)2(15+2𝑘𝑘(7+2𝑘𝑘))−2(1+2𝑘𝑘)(6+𝑘𝑘(5+2𝑘𝑘))𝛽𝛽+2𝛽𝛽2)2(1+2𝑘𝑘)2(21+2𝑘𝑘(17+6𝑘𝑘))−4(1+2𝑘𝑘)(6+𝑘𝑘(3−2𝑘𝑘))𝛽𝛽+4𝛽𝛽2   𝐴𝐴3 = (𝑎𝑎 + 2𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘)2((1 + 2𝑘𝑘)4(1053 + 2𝑘𝑘(3699 + 4𝑘𝑘(1968 + 𝑘𝑘(1907 + 4𝑘𝑘(236 + 𝑘𝑘(59 + 6𝑘𝑘)))))) − 2(1 + 2𝑘𝑘)3(405 + 𝑘𝑘(2307 +
2𝑘𝑘(893− 2𝑘𝑘(537 + 14𝑘𝑘(59 + 26𝑘𝑘 + 4𝑘𝑘2)))))𝛽𝛽 + 8(1 + 2𝑘𝑘)(36 + 𝑘𝑘(256 + 𝑘𝑘(5 + 2𝑘𝑘)(135 + 65𝑘𝑘 − 12𝑘𝑘3)))𝛽𝛽3 − 4(21 + 2𝑘𝑘(61 +
2𝑘𝑘(53 + 2𝑘𝑘(7 − 4𝑘𝑘(2 + 𝑘𝑘)))))𝛽𝛽4 + 8(1 + 3𝑘𝑘)𝛽𝛽5 − 4(42 + 𝑘𝑘(524 + 𝑘𝑘(2621 + 2𝑘𝑘(2027 + 4𝑘𝑘(339 + 𝑘𝑘(107 + 14𝑘𝑘))))))(𝛽𝛽 + 2𝑘𝑘𝛽𝛽)2) 
 
Table 3 Equilibrium results under no free licensing of public licensor 𝑞𝑞0𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = 9𝑆𝑆(17+2𝛽𝛽)2𝑘𝑘(15+𝛽𝛽)2+9(17+2𝛽𝛽)  𝑄𝑄𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = 𝑆𝑆(9(17+2𝛽𝛽)+2𝑘𝑘(90−21𝛽𝛽+𝛽𝛽2))2𝑘𝑘(15−𝛽𝛽)2+9(17+2𝛽𝛽)   
𝑞𝑞1𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = 6𝑆𝑆𝑘𝑘(15−𝛽𝛽)2𝑘𝑘(15−𝛽𝛽)2+9(17+2𝛽𝛽)  𝜋𝜋0𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = 81𝑆𝑆2𝑘𝑘(17+2𝛽𝛽)(13−4𝛽𝛽)(2𝑘𝑘(15−𝛽𝛽)2+9(17+2𝛽𝛽))2  
𝑞𝑞2𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = 2𝑆𝑆𝑘𝑘(15−𝛽𝛽)(3−𝛽𝛽)2𝑘𝑘(15−𝛽𝛽)2+9(17+2𝛽𝛽)  𝜋𝜋1𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = 72𝑆𝑆2𝑘𝑘2(15−𝛽𝛽)2(2𝑘𝑘(15−𝛽𝛽)2+9(17+2𝛽𝛽))2  𝜋𝜋2𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = 4𝑆𝑆2𝑘𝑘2(15−𝛽𝛽)2(3−𝛽𝛽)(6+𝛽𝛽)(2𝑘𝑘(15−𝛽𝛽)2+9(17+2𝛽𝛽))2   𝑉𝑉0𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = 9𝑆𝑆2(18𝑘𝑘(15−𝛽𝛽)(21−2𝛽𝛽)(17+2𝛽𝛽)2+81(17+2𝛽𝛽)3+8𝑘𝑘3(15−𝛽𝛽)2(2+3𝛽𝛽)(72−(48−𝛽𝛽)𝛽𝛽)+4𝑘𝑘2(15−𝛽𝛽)(17+2𝛽𝛽)(1647−𝛽𝛽(378+𝛽𝛽(63+𝛽𝛽))))2(2𝑘𝑘(15−𝛽𝛽)(3+2𝛽𝛽)−9(17+2𝛽𝛽))(2𝑘𝑘(15−𝛽𝛽)2+9(17+2𝛽𝛽))2   𝑉𝑉1𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = 72𝑆𝑆2𝑘𝑘2(15−𝛽𝛽)2(1−𝛽𝛽)(2𝑘𝑘(−15+𝛽𝛽)2+9(17+2𝛽𝛽))2  𝑉𝑉2𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = 4𝑆𝑆2𝑘𝑘2(15−𝛽𝛽)2(18+(15−𝛽𝛽)𝛽𝛽)(2𝑘𝑘(15−𝛽𝛽)2+9(17+2𝛽𝛽))2   𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = 𝑆𝑆2(2𝑘𝑘(15−𝛽𝛽)(6−𝛽𝛽)+9(17+2𝛽𝛽))22(2𝑘𝑘(15−𝛽𝛽)2+9(17+2𝛽𝛽))2   𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = 𝑆𝑆2(9(17+2𝛽𝛽)+2𝑘𝑘(72−(48−𝛽𝛽)𝛽𝛽))306+4𝑘𝑘(15−𝛽𝛽)2+36𝛽𝛽   
 
Table 4 Equilibrium results under free licensing of public licensor 𝑞𝑞0𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = 3𝑆𝑆(5+4𝛽𝛽+2𝑘𝑘(13+10𝑘𝑘+𝛽𝛽))3(5+4𝛽𝛽)+2𝑘𝑘(88+64𝑘𝑘2+2𝑘𝑘(71−8𝛽𝛽)−(11−𝛽𝛽)𝛽𝛽)  𝑞𝑞2𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = 2𝑆𝑆𝑘𝑘(1+2𝑘𝑘−𝛽𝛽)(7+8𝑘𝑘−𝛽𝛽)3(5+4𝛽𝛽)+2𝑘𝑘(88+64𝑘𝑘2+2𝑘𝑘(71−8𝛽𝛽)−(11−𝛽𝛽)𝛽𝛽)  𝜋𝜋0𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = 27𝑆𝑆2𝑘𝑘(3+6𝑘𝑘+4𝑘𝑘2−2(1+𝑘𝑘)𝛽𝛽)(5+4𝛽𝛽+2𝑘𝑘(13+10𝑘𝑘+𝛽𝛽))(3(5+4𝛽𝛽)+2𝑘𝑘(88+64𝑘𝑘2+2𝑘𝑘(71−8𝛽𝛽)−(11−𝛽𝛽)𝛽𝛽))2   𝜋𝜋2𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = 4𝑆𝑆2𝑘𝑘2(1+2𝑘𝑘−𝛽𝛽)(7+8𝑘𝑘−𝛽𝛽)2(2+4𝑘𝑘+𝛽𝛽)(3(5+4𝛽𝛽)+2𝑘𝑘(88+64𝑘𝑘2+2𝑘𝑘(71−8𝛽𝛽)−(11−𝛽𝛽)𝛽𝛽))2  
𝑞𝑞1𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = 6𝑆𝑆𝑘𝑘(7+8𝑘𝑘−𝛽𝛽)3(5+4𝛽𝛽)+2𝑘𝑘(88+64𝑘𝑘2+2𝑘𝑘(71−8𝛽𝛽)−(11−𝛽𝛽)𝛽𝛽)  𝑄𝑄𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = 𝑆𝑆(3(5+4𝛽𝛽)+2𝑘𝑘(67+16𝑘𝑘2+𝑘𝑘(76−10𝛽𝛽)−(8−𝛽𝛽)𝛽𝛽))3(5+4𝛽𝛽)+2𝑘𝑘(88+64𝑘𝑘2+2𝑘𝑘(71−8𝛽𝛽)−(11−𝛽𝛽)𝛽𝛽)   𝜋𝜋1𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = 36𝑆𝑆2𝑘𝑘2(1+𝑘𝑘)(7+8𝑘𝑘−𝛽𝛽)2�3(5+4𝛽𝛽)+2𝑘𝑘(88+64𝑘𝑘2+2𝑘𝑘(71−8𝛽𝛽)−(11−𝛽𝛽)𝛽𝛽)�2  
𝑉𝑉0𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = 𝐴𝐴42�3(5+4𝛽𝛽)+2𝑘𝑘(88+64𝑘𝑘2+2𝑘𝑘(71−8𝛽𝛽)−(11−𝛽𝛽)𝛽𝛽)�2(3(5+4𝛽𝛽)+4𝑘𝑘(23+8𝑘𝑘2+(8−𝛽𝛽)𝛽𝛽+𝑘𝑘(26+7𝛽𝛽)))  𝑉𝑉1𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = 36𝑆𝑆2𝑘𝑘2(1+𝑘𝑘)(1−+𝛽𝛽)(7+8𝑘𝑘−𝛽𝛽)2(3(5+4𝛽𝛽)+2𝑘𝑘(88+64𝑘𝑘2+2𝑘𝑘(71−8𝛽𝛽)−(11−𝛽𝛽)𝛽𝛽))2   𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = 𝑆𝑆2(3(5+4𝛽𝛽)+2𝑘𝑘(67+16𝑘𝑘2+𝑘𝑘(76−10𝛽𝛽)−(8−𝛽𝛽)𝛽𝛽))22(3(5+4𝛽𝛽)+2𝑘𝑘(88+64𝑘𝑘2+2𝑘𝑘(71−8𝛽𝛽)−(11−𝛽𝛽)𝛽𝛽))2  𝑉𝑉2
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = 4𝑆𝑆2𝑘𝑘2(7+8𝑘𝑘−𝛽𝛽)2(2+8𝑘𝑘(1+𝑘𝑘)+8𝛽𝛽+7𝑘𝑘𝛽𝛽−𝛽𝛽2)
(3(5+4𝛽𝛽)+2𝑘𝑘(88+64𝑘𝑘2+2𝑘𝑘(71−8𝛽𝛽)−(11−𝛽𝛽)𝛽𝛽))2  𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = 𝑆𝑆2(3(5+4𝛽𝛽)+2𝑘𝑘(73+4𝑘𝑘(16+𝑘𝑘)−23𝛽𝛽−22𝑘𝑘𝛽𝛽+𝛽𝛽2))6(5+4𝛽𝛽)+4𝑘𝑘(88+64𝑘𝑘2+2𝑘𝑘(71−8𝛽𝛽)−(11−𝛽𝛽)𝛽𝛽)   𝐴𝐴4 = 3𝑎𝑎2(8192𝑘𝑘9 + 1024𝑘𝑘8(185− 38𝛽𝛽) + 9(5 + 4𝛽𝛽)3 + 12𝑘𝑘(5 + 4𝛽𝛽)2(97− (8− 𝛽𝛽)𝛽𝛽) + 128𝑘𝑘7(8262− 𝛽𝛽(1433 + 263𝛽𝛽)) +
64𝑘𝑘6(41819− 𝛽𝛽(4813 + 𝛽𝛽(2928− 191𝛽𝛽))) + 4𝑘𝑘2(5 + 4𝛽𝛽)(13948− 𝛽𝛽(46 + 𝛽𝛽(306− 𝛽𝛽(38 + 𝛽𝛽)))) + 32𝑘𝑘5(113887−𝛽𝛽(3000 + 𝛽𝛽(12376− 𝛽𝛽(1342− 37𝛽𝛽)))) + 16𝑘𝑘4(176100− 𝛽𝛽(20971 + 𝛽𝛽(24854− 𝛽𝛽(3069 − 𝛽𝛽(157− 2𝛽𝛽))))) +
8𝑘𝑘3(153052 + 𝛽𝛽(56054− 𝛽𝛽(21888− 𝛽𝛽(2015− 𝛽𝛽(113− 6𝛽𝛽))))))  
21 
 
Table 5 Equilibrium results under open technology 
𝑞𝑞0𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 = 𝑆𝑆(1+2𝑘𝑘)2(3+2𝑘𝑘(5+2𝑘𝑘+𝛽𝛽))3+2𝑘𝑘(4𝑘𝑘(19+𝑘𝑘(29+2𝑘𝑘(9+2𝑘𝑘)))+5(4−𝛽𝛽)−4𝑘𝑘(3+𝑘𝑘)𝛽𝛽+𝛽𝛽2) 𝑞𝑞1𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 = 2𝑆𝑆𝑘𝑘(1+2𝑘𝑘)(3+4𝑘𝑘(2+𝑘𝑘)−𝛽𝛽)3+2𝑘𝑘(4𝑘𝑘(19+𝑘𝑘(29+2𝑘𝑘(9+2𝑘𝑘)))+5(4−𝛽𝛽)−4𝑘𝑘(3+𝑘𝑘)𝛽𝛽+𝛽𝛽2)  𝑞𝑞2𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 = 2𝑆𝑆𝑘𝑘(1+2𝑘𝑘−𝛽𝛽)(3+4𝑘𝑘(2+𝑘𝑘)−𝛽𝛽)3+2𝑘𝑘(4𝑘𝑘(19+𝑘𝑘(29+2𝑘𝑘(9+2𝑘𝑘)))+5(4−𝛽𝛽)−4𝑘𝑘(3+𝑘𝑘)𝛽𝛽+𝛽𝛽2)  𝑄𝑄𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 = 𝑆𝑆(3+2𝑘𝑘(17+68𝑘𝑘2+24𝑘𝑘3+8𝑘𝑘(7−𝛽𝛽)−(4−𝛽𝛽)𝛽𝛽))3+2𝑘𝑘(4𝑘𝑘(19+𝑘𝑘(29+2𝑘𝑘(9+2𝑘𝑘)))+5(4−𝛽𝛽)−4𝑘𝑘(3+𝑘𝑘)𝛽𝛽+𝛽𝛽2)  𝜋𝜋0𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 = 𝑆𝑆2𝑘𝑘(1+2𝑘𝑘)4(3+6𝑘𝑘+4𝑘𝑘2−2(1+𝑘𝑘)𝛽𝛽)(3+2𝑘𝑘(5+2𝑘𝑘+𝛽𝛽))
(3+2𝑘𝑘(4𝑘𝑘�19+𝑘𝑘�29+2𝑘𝑘(9+2𝑘𝑘)��+5(4−𝛽𝛽)−4𝑘𝑘(3+𝑘𝑘)𝛽𝛽+𝛽𝛽2))2  𝜋𝜋1𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 = 4𝑆𝑆2𝑘𝑘2(1+𝑘𝑘)(1+2𝑘𝑘)2(3+4𝑘𝑘(2+𝑘𝑘)−𝛽𝛽)2(3+2𝑘𝑘(4𝑘𝑘(19+𝑘𝑘(29+2𝑘𝑘(9+2𝑘𝑘)))+5(4−𝛽𝛽)−4𝑘𝑘(3+𝑘𝑘)𝛽𝛽+𝛽𝛽2))2  
𝜋𝜋2𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 = 4𝑆𝑆2𝑘𝑘2(1+2𝑘𝑘−𝛽𝛽)(3+4𝑘𝑘(2+𝑘𝑘)−𝛽𝛽)2(1+𝑘𝑘(3+2𝑘𝑘+𝛽𝛽))(3+2𝑘𝑘(4𝑘𝑘(19+𝑘𝑘(29+2𝑘𝑘(9+2𝑘𝑘)))+5(4−𝛽𝛽)−4𝑘𝑘(3+𝑘𝑘)𝛽𝛽+𝛽𝛽2))2  𝑉𝑉0𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 = 𝐴𝐴5(2(3+2𝑘𝑘(4𝑘𝑘(19+𝑘𝑘(29+2𝑘𝑘(9+2𝑘𝑘)))+5(4−𝛽𝛽)−4𝑘𝑘(3+𝑘𝑘)𝛽𝛽+𝛽𝛽2))2(3+4𝑘𝑘(7+𝑘𝑘(21+8𝑘𝑘(3+𝑘𝑘)+4𝛽𝛽+2𝑘𝑘(5+2𝑘𝑘)𝛽𝛽−𝛽𝛽2))))  𝑉𝑉1𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 = 4𝑆𝑆2𝑘𝑘2(1+𝑘𝑘)(1+2𝑘𝑘)2(1−𝛽𝛽)(3+4𝑘𝑘(2+𝑘𝑘)−𝛽𝛽)2(3+2𝑘𝑘(4𝑘𝑘(19+𝑘𝑘(29+2𝑘𝑘(9+2𝑘𝑘)))+5(4−𝛽𝛽)−4𝑘𝑘(3+𝑘𝑘)𝛽𝛽+𝛽𝛽2))2 𝑉𝑉2𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 = 4𝑆𝑆2𝑘𝑘2(3+4𝑘𝑘(2+𝑘𝑘)−𝛽𝛽)2(1+𝑘𝑘(5+(3−𝛽𝛽)𝛽𝛽+8𝑘𝑘(1+𝛽𝛽)+4𝑘𝑘2(1+𝛽𝛽)))(3+2𝑘𝑘(4𝑘𝑘(19+𝑘𝑘(29+2𝑘𝑘(9+2𝑘𝑘)))+5(4−𝛽𝛽)−4𝑘𝑘(3+𝑘𝑘)𝛽𝛽+𝛽𝛽2))2   𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 = 𝑆𝑆2(3+2𝑘𝑘(17+68𝑘𝑘2+24𝑘𝑘3+8𝑘𝑘(7−𝛽𝛽)−(4−𝛽𝛽)𝛽𝛽))22(3+2𝑘𝑘(4𝑘𝑘(19+𝑘𝑘(29+2𝑘𝑘(9+2𝑘𝑘)))+5(4−𝛽𝛽)−4𝑘𝑘(3+𝑘𝑘)𝛽𝛽+𝛽𝛽2))2  𝑊𝑊𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 = 𝑆𝑆2(3+2𝑘𝑘(17+2𝑘𝑘(3+2𝑘𝑘)(9+4𝑘𝑘)−5𝛽𝛽−2𝑘𝑘(7+6𝑘𝑘+4𝑘𝑘2)𝛽𝛽+𝛽𝛽2))6+4𝑘𝑘(4𝑘𝑘(19+𝑘𝑘(29+2𝑘𝑘(9+2𝑘𝑘)))+5(4−𝛽𝛽)−4𝑘𝑘(3+𝑘𝑘)𝛽𝛽+𝛽𝛽2)  
𝐴𝐴5 = (𝑎𝑎 + 2𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘)2((1 + 2𝑘𝑘)4(27 + 4𝑘𝑘(135 + 𝑘𝑘(963 + 2𝑘𝑘(1451 + 4𝑘𝑘(520 + 𝑘𝑘(371 + 2𝑘𝑘(63 + 8𝑘𝑘)))))))− 4𝑘𝑘(1 + 2𝑘𝑘)3(36−𝑘𝑘(411 + 4𝑘𝑘(241 + 2𝑘𝑘(17− 2𝑘𝑘(86 + 3𝑘𝑘(25 + 6𝑘𝑘))))))𝛽𝛽 − 8𝑘𝑘2(1 + 2𝑘𝑘)2(9− 𝑘𝑘(87 + 2𝑘𝑘(103 + 2𝑘𝑘(41 + 2𝑘𝑘(9 + 2𝑘𝑘)))))𝛽𝛽3 +
4𝑘𝑘2(1 + 2𝑘𝑘)(3− 4𝑘𝑘(9 + 2𝑘𝑘(7 + 2𝑘𝑘)))𝛽𝛽4 + 16𝑘𝑘3(1 + 𝑘𝑘)𝛽𝛽5 + 4𝑘𝑘(9 + 2𝑘𝑘(66− 𝑘𝑘(13 + 2𝑘𝑘(389 + 2𝑘𝑘(413 + 4𝑘𝑘(102 + 𝑘𝑘(63 +




[Fig. 1] Foreign firm’s objective between no licensing and free licensing 
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[Fig. 2] Public licensors objective between free licensing and no free licensing 
 
 











Appendix C: Proofs of Lemmas and Propositions 
 
The proof of Lemma 1.  𝜃𝜃𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ∈ [0, 1) is decreasing in 𝛽𝛽 and 𝑘𝑘 
[Fig. A1] The optimal degree of privatization under no licensing of foreign firm 
 
 
The proof of Lemma 2. 𝜃𝜃𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ∈ [0, 1) is decreasing in 𝛽𝛽 and 𝑘𝑘 





The proof of Lemma 5 
 
[Fig. A3] Public firm’s profit between no licensing and free licensing 
 
 
The proof of Lemma 6. 𝜃𝜃𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ∈ [0, 1) is decreasing in 𝛽𝛽 but is increasing 𝑘𝑘 




The proof of Lemma 7. 𝜃𝜃𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ∈ [0, 1) is decreasing in 𝛽𝛽 but is increasing 𝑘𝑘 
[Fig. A5] The optimal degree of privatization under free licensing of public firm 
 
The proof of Lemma 8. (𝑖𝑖) 




The proof of Lemma 9.  
[Fig.A7] Consumer surplus between no licensing and free licensing under public licensing 
 
The proof of Lemma10.  




The proof of Lemma 11. 𝜃𝜃OT ∈ [0, 1) is decreasing in 𝛽𝛽 but is increasing 𝑘𝑘 
 
[Fig. A9] The optimal degree of privatization under open technology 
 
Proof of Proposition 8 
(𝑖𝑖)  𝜗𝜗^ = 𝜃𝜃OT − 𝜃𝜃NF < 0 and (𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 𝜃𝜃~ = 𝜃𝜃OT − 𝜃𝜃FP > 0 
 
[Fig. A10-1] Comparisons of the optimal degree of privatization 
 
(𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 𝑞𝑞0^ = 𝑞𝑞0OT − 𝑞𝑞0FP >< 0, (𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 𝑞𝑞1^ = 𝑞𝑞1OT − 𝑞𝑞1FP < 0, (𝑖𝑖) 𝑞𝑞2^ = 𝑞𝑞2OT − 𝑞𝑞2FP > 0, and (𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 𝑄𝑄^ =𝑄𝑄OT − 𝑄𝑄FP > 0  
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[Fig. A10-2] Comparisons of the Output between open technology and public free licensing 
 
Proof of Proposition 10 
[Fig. A11] Open technology vs. Public free licensing 
